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Abstract
We introduce a model analyzing how asymmetric information problems in
a bank-loan market may evolve over the age of a borrowing firm. The model
predicts a life-cycle pattern for banks’ interest rate markup. Young firms pay
a low or negative markup, thereafter the markup increases until it falls for old
firms. Furthermore, the pattern of the life-cycle depends on the informational
advantage of the inside bank and when more dispersed borrower information
yields fiercer bank competition. By applying a new measure of the informa-
tional advantage of inside banks and a large sample of small Norwegian firms,
we find empirical support for the predicted markup pattern. We disentangle
eﬀects of asymmetric information (Akerlof eﬀect) from eﬀects of a concen-
trated bank market (Herfindahl eﬀect). Our results indicate that the interest
rate markups are not influenced by bank market concentration.
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1. Introduction
We analyze how competition and asymmetric information problems are interlinked in
credit markets. During the course of a lending relationship a bank obtains privileged
information about borrowers. The privileged information is a two-edged sword seen
from borrowers’ point of view. Privileged information reduces frictions in credit
markets, but creates lock-in eﬀects and market power for the inside bank, i.e., the
bank with which the firm has a relationship.
One of the contributions of this paper is in oﬀering a dynamic model of bank-
borrower relationship that evolves over three distinct periods in the life cycle of the
borrowing firm. Initially, before any bank has obtained privileged information about
young firms, they are oﬀered loans with a low or even negative interest rate markup.
By interest rate markup we mean the diﬀerence between the actual contractual
interest rate and the risk-adjusted interest rate, i.e., the one that gives the lender
zero expected profits. As the firm’s inside bank gets access to privileged information
about the borrowing firm, it becomes informationally locked-in and the bank can
extract rents by increasing the interest rate markup. However, as the firm matures,
specific soft information about the firm gets more dispersed. Consequently the
market power of the inside bank decreases, as outside banks now find it profitable to
monitor the borrower and oﬀer loans. Hence, the markup is reduced. The existing
theoretical literature on relationship lending and informational lock-in only deals
with two distinct periods, the initial period when the borrower is subsidized and the
second period when he is locked-in.1 In contrast, our model can also explain how
informational lock-in is resolved.
The model predicts that this pattern of the interest rate markup over a firm’s life
cycle will be more pronounced the more important is the soft information the inside
bank can obtain, i.e., the larger is the information asymmetry between the inside
bank and the outside banks. We test this and other predictions of our model using
panel data of small Norwegian non-financial firms during the 2000-2001 period with a
total of 60,362 observations. We construct a novel measure proxying the importance
of the information asymmetry.
1See for instance Rajan (1992), Sharpe (1990) and, von Thadden (2004).
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This paper focuses on the importance of information asymmetries in determining
banks’ market power in credit markets characterized by relationship lending. It is
the degree of asymmetric information and the consequent lack of competition that
determines to what extent banks intertemporally share their surplus in long-term
bank relationships. This approach diﬀers from that of Petersen and Rajan (1995).
In their much cited paper, Petersen and Rajan also construct a model where lack
of competition in the credit markets allows banks to subsidize young de novo firms
and recapture this loss by charging older locked-in borrowers an interest rate above
the one yielding them zero expected profits. However, in Petersen and Rajan (1995)
lack of competition in the credit market is represented by the degree of market
concentration (Herfindahl). Our study diﬀers from Petersen and Rajan in the sense
that we let the competitiveness of the credit market be determined by the availability
of soft information about the borrowers (Akerlof). In the empirical setup we are
able to test simultaneously whether intertemporal surplus sharing through long-term
bank relationships is determined by the degree of information asymmetry between
the inside bank and outside banks, or by the concentration in credit markets as in
Petersen and Rajan (1995). Our results indicate that the former is the determining
factor rather than the latter.2
In our theoretical model the number of banks that monitor a borrower and
thereby the strength and time-span of the lock-in eﬀect are endogenized. This
model is closely related to other models also explaining how firms can mitigate hold-
up problems or lock-in eﬀects by establishing several bank relationships.3 However,
these models focus on situations where firms decide, in the first period, on the
number of bank relationships. In contrast, our setup makes multiple monitoring
of young firms unprofitable. We argue that fixed monitoring costs cannot initially
2There are other empirical papers that also check the robustness of some of the findings by
Petersen and Rajan, although with a diﬀerent approach from ours. All in all these studies seem to
give mixed results. Black and Strahan (2002) find that less concentrated banking markets lead to
more incorporations of new firms, thus casting doubts on Petersen and Rajan’s findings. Similarly
Cetorelli (2004) finds that a more concentrated banking industry leads to larger size of the non-
financial firms. Cetorelli and Gambera (2001), however, report results indicating that younger
firms relying on external finance grow faster the more concentrated is the banking sector. A brief
overview of this literature can be found in Berger, Hasan, and Klapper (2003).
3Ongena and Smith (2000) show in an empirical study, that multiple relationships reduce the
hold-up problem, but can worsen the availability of credit. See also Detragiache, Garella, and
Guiso (2000).
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be covered by more than one bank. Other researchers have argued that multiple
monitoring is infeasible due to free-riding problems (Thakor (1996)).4 We show that
as firms mature, more banks (or other monitors) find it profitable to monitor them
and thereby alleviate firms’ hold-up or lock-in problem. Existing literature allows
firms to determine the number of banks from which they borrow. In contrast, we let
improvements in the pool of loan applicants as the firms mature and the accordingly
increased bank competition determine when lock-in problems are resolved.
There is a growing literature arguing that competition intensity also influences
banks investments in borrower-bank relationships. Boot and Thakor (2000), Elsas
(2005), Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004), and Degryse and Ongena (2004) all show
that competition may have an important impact on banks’ investments in industry
expertise and relationship development. If fiercer competition induces banks on av-
erage to provide more valuable services to their borrowers, we might expect to see
that equilibrium interest rates are higher in more competitive markets. Boot and
Thakor (2000) show in their theoretical model how fierce bank competition may
induce banks to substitute transactional lending with relationship lending thereby
insulating a larger share of their loan portfolio from competition induced by rivalling
banks. The average borrower may, due to this substitution eﬀect, increase his will-
ingness to pay high interest rates. In the empirical part of the present study, we
are also able to examine whether competition, measured as market concentration,
increases borrowers’ willingness to pay high interest rates.
The paper is organized as follow: In Section 2 we present a theoretical model
showing how the severity of asymmetric information aﬀects borrower lock-in and
hence competition between banks and interest rate markups. The empirical model
testing both the predictions regarding markups and asymmetric information ema-
nating from our theoretical model, as well as the aforementioned potential relation-
ships between markups and market concentration, is presented along with the data
in Section 3. The empirical results are presented and discussed in Section 4. Section
5 concludes.
4Carletti (2004) endogenizes banks’ monitoring intensities and shows how firms by choosing to
borrow from more than one bank can induce a preferred monitoring intensity. In contrast to our
model, Carletti does not introduce a dynamic model that allows the number of monitoring banks
to change as the firms mature.
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2. Theory
In this section we introduce a theoretical model of bank competition that shows how
the lifecycle of the interest rate markup depends on two types of asymmetric informa-
tion problems. Firstly, there is an asymmetric information problem between banks
and borrowers and, secondly, there is a potential asymmetric information problem
between inside and outside banks when they "bid". The model endogenizes the
number of monitoring banks in order to show how firm specific information gets
dispersed and lock-in eﬀects weaken. The theoretical model allows us to derive pre-
dictions about how the two types of asymmetric information problems influence the
length of the lock-in period and the timing and size of the minimum and maximum
interest rate markup charged by banks.
In what follows we outline the model in detail.
2.1. The borrowing firm
A firm is modelled as a sequence of projects all requiring investment of 1. For sim-
plicity, we assume that the firm does not have own funds and needs to borrow 1 from
a bank in each period t, t ≥ 0 (see Rajan (1992) for why asymmetric information
problems may imply that only short-term loan contracts are used in equilibrium).
In our adverse-selection model, a project in each period is either good or bad
independently of the quality of the previous project. The good project succeeds
with probability θ + β while the bad project succeeds with probability θ − β. A
successful project is worth R while a failure is worth 0. Apart from Proposition
4 which concerns credit availability, we assume that both good and bad projects
have positive NPV, i.e., (θ − β)R > 1. The probability of having a good project
in period t is common knowledge and denoted s(t). We assume that the average
quality of borrowers is improving as the firms mature ("survival of the fittest"), i.e.,
s0(t) > 0. Consequently, we assume that experienced firms are more likely to have
good projects than young and unexperienced firms.
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2.2. Banks
There are two banks that consider monitoring the firm.5 Let F > 0 denote per-
period monitoring cost. Although, monitoring cost incurs in each period, we assume
that monitoring decisions are long-term commitments; a monitoring bank will con-
tinue to do monitoring although a rivaling bank starts monitoring. Furthermore,
it is assumed that F is suﬃciently large compared with expected profit to make it
unprofitable for both banks to start monitoring in period 0. The inside bank moni-
tors the firm and with probability λ it is revealed to the bank whether the project is
good or bad. The outside and inside banks both have access to the same information
about the project with probability (1− λ). Notice, however, that the outside bank
does not know whether the inside bank has obtained privileged information or not.
An outside bank knows only the probability of the firm being of a good type, i.e.
s(t).
The competition between the two banks is considered as an ”English auction”
where banks decrease their interest rates until one bank is active and this bank
captures the borrower. If the two banks’ lowest interest rates are identical and they
both monitor the borrower, they capture the borrower with equal probability. If
only one bank does monitoring, the borrower will weakly favour the existing lender.
This assumption ensures that, in equilibrium, there will not be change of lenders
as long as only one bank does monitoring, but the rivaling outside bank limits the
interest-rate markup the inside bank can obtain.6
For simplicity, we assume that firms and banks are risk neutral and that the
risk-free interest rate is 0.
In our set up banks know that the average quality of borrowers is improving
as the borrowers age and this makes it increasingly attractive for banks to bear
the fixed monitoring costs and make credit assessment in order to make loan oﬀers.
When a second bank starts making credit assessments, information about borrowers
5We endogenize when the second bank starts monitoring. A straight forward generalization of
our model would be to endogenize when n > 2 banks start monitoring.
6In an English auction an auctioneer starts with a high interest rate and gradually decreases
it. The current interest rate, r, is observed by all banks (bidders) and the banks choose whether
to be in the competition or to exit. Banks may drop out at any time, and if they do they are not
allowed to reenter the competition (auction) for the borrower. When the auction ends there is only
one active bank. See Krishna (2002) for a discussion of diﬀerent rules in English auctions.
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success probabilities becomes more dispersed and bank competition increases. In
the next section we examine the market equilibrium in detail.
2.3. Equilibrium
We will show that there exists a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
where one bank lends to and monitors a firm from date 0 and the second bank starts
monitoring at date T > 0. Let π denote the profit obtained by the first bank until
the second bank start monitoring (π will be analyzed subsequently).
In equilibrium the banks set their interest rates, re, as described by Proposition
1.
Proposition 1.
i) At t = 0 both banks oﬀer interest rates that will remove all long term profit
re (t = 0) = s(0)
1
θ + β
+ (1− s(0)) 1
θ − β − π − 1.
ii) At t ∈ [1, T − 1] the outside bank expects to capture only bad projects and
oﬀers interest rates, re, reflecting the risk of bad projects
re (1 < t ≤ T − 1) = 1
θ − β − 1
and the inside bank will keep the borrower by oﬀering the same interest rate as the
outside bank.
iii) At t ∈ [T,∞i both banks may acquire privileged information. Interest rate
charged a borrower having a good project depends on whether more than one bank
has this information (probability λ2),
reG (T ≤ t) =
½ 1
θ+β − 1
1
θ−β − 1
with probability λ2
with probability 1− λ2
while the interest rate charged a borrower with a bad project reflects its credit risk
reB (T ≤ t) =
1
θ − β − 1
Proof. Part i): Straightforward.
Part ii): Note that the bidding behaviour of the informed inside bank is such
that its lowest bid implies zero profit. The outside bank will correctly expect that
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it only will capture borrowers with bad projects if it improves its interest rate bid
from r = 1θ−β − 1 and this will make a better interest bid nonprofitable.
Part iii): The same argument as for Part ii) can be applied for Part iii).
Proposition 1 describes bank competition taking the second bank’s monitoring
decision as given (T is taken as given). We will now analyze T and study when
the second bank starts monitoring. First, note that the second bank’s expected
one-period profit is
λ (1− λ) s(t)
½
(θ + β)
1
θ − β − 1
¾
− F
or
λ (1− λ) s(t)
½
2β
θ − β
¾
− F
if it monitors. In the above expression, λ (1− λ) denotes the probability of obtaining
exclusive privileged information, s(t) is the probability that the project is good and
succeeds with probability (θ+ β). In case of success, the firm is able to pay the face
value of debt which is
³
1
θ−β
´
if the other bank fears that the borrower has a bad
project.7
The second bank finds it profitable to start monitoring when the per-period profit
exceeds the monitoring costs. More formally, the following condition (2.1) describes
when the second bank starts monitoring (T ).
λ (1− λ) s(T )
½
2β
θ − β
¾
> F > λ (1− λ) s(T − 1)
½
2β
θ − β
¾
(2.1)
Condition (2.1) states that it is non-profitable to start monitoring in period T − 1
but profitable in period T . Since s0(t) > 0 it follows that T is uniquely defined by
condition (2.1).
We can now calculate the profit from capturing the borrower in period 0 instead
of waiting until period T and then start monitoring;
π =
2β
θ − β
t=T−1X
t=1
s(t)− TF
7The inside bank oﬀers a loan contract that makes the entrepreneur indiﬀerent between accept-
ing the contract from the inside bank and accepting the contract from the outside bank. Since the
outside bank oﬀers a contract reflecting that only the low type borrowers will switch banks, the
diﬀerence is
³
R−
³
R− 1θ−β
´´
= 1θ−β .
9
In a competitive bank-loan market (Bertrand competition) where banks expect to
profit from long-term bank-borrower relationships, banks price their initial loans at
date 0 very aggressively in order to attract new borrowers. Competition at date 0
drives the interest rate down until the winning bank spends the entire anticipated
profits (π) to subsidize the initial loan.
We can now compare the equilibrium interest rate with the interest rate yield-
ing zero-bank profit provided that the bank has only access to public information.
Denote this benchmark interest rate r∗(t),
r∗(t) = s(t)
1
θ + β
+ (1− s(t)) 1
θ − β − 1. (2.2)
Note that r∗(t) is decreasing as the quality of the average borrower improves, i.e.
s(t) increases. The markup on the benchmark interest rate in period t is mt =
re(t)− r∗(t). From the definition of r∗(t) and Proposition 1 it follows directly that:
Proposition 2. The markup, mt, follows a life cycle pattern;
i) in period t = 0, we have mt < 0
ii) in the following periods, t ∈ [1, T − 1] , mt is increasing in t.
iii) in period T, we have mT < mT−1.
Note that the equilibrium interest rate at T−1 is 1θ−β −1, while at T it decreases
to
¡
1− λ2s(t)
¢
1
θ−β + λ
2s(t) 1θ+β − 1 where λ
2s(t) is the probability that both banks
have discovered that the project is good.
In Proposition 3 we show that the life cycle of the markup may depend on the
size of the monitoring costs which we associate with the prevalence of asymmetric
information problems in the credit market. Firms with more asymmetric information
problems and, consequently, higher monitoring costs may have a diﬀerent markup
cycle than firms with lower monitoring costs.
Proposition 3. Firms with high monitoring costs (F ),
i) have a longer lock-in period (T ) than firms with low monitoring costs.
ii) have a higher maximum markup (mT ) than firms with low monitoring costs.
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Proof. Part i) follows directly from (2.1) and the assumption that s0 (t) > 0.
Part ii): Note that the markup for period t ∈ [1, T − 1] is given by
mt =
µ
1
θ − β − 1
¶
−
µ
s(t− 1) 1
θ + β
+ (1− s(t− 1)) 1
θ − β − 1
¶
=
2β
(θ + β) (θ − β)s (t− 1)
and that s0 (t) > 0. Part ii) follows from observing that mt reaches its maximum
at t = T − 1 and that T is increasing in F (follows from part i).
Not only markups but also credit availability may depend on asymmetric infor-
mation problems in credit markets. In order to focus on potential eﬀects on credit
availability we will allow firms to have negative NPV projects in the first period.
Consequently, some firms will be unable to obtain funding in period 0 unless banks
expect to gain from long-run bank-borrower relationships. We divert from the set
up above by making one new assumption; in the first period the success probability
is between 0 and 1, or more formally in period 0 we let θ = θ0 ∈ [β, 1− β]. A bank
is willing to lend to all borrowers in period 0 with θ0 > θˆ where θˆ is defined by
1 = s(0)
³
θˆ + β
´
R+ (1− s(0))
³
θˆ − β
´
R| {z }
Expected pay back on the first loan
+ Π|{z}
Long run gain
where Π is total profit banks expect to earn on a borrower (may contain profit after
the lock-in period ends). A bank is willing to lend the borrower 1 dollar — although
the expected pay back on the initial loan is low — as long as the long run-gain from
establishing a bank-borrower relationship is suﬃciently large. By observing that a
longer lock-in period increases Π, we have Proposition 4:
Proposition 4. A bank accepts borrowers with lower first-period success probabil-
ities (lower θˆ) if the profits from lock-in, Π, increases.
In the empirical section to follow, we show how the asymmetric information
problems and lock-in eﬀects evolve for a large sample of Norwegian firms.
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3. Empirical investigation
3.1. Hypotheses and modelling
In this section we specify an empirical model in order to test the empirical implica-
tions or hypotheses derived from the theoretical model in section 2:
I The interest rate markup follows a life cycle pattern over the firm’s age: young
firms pay a low or negative markup, thereafter the markup increases until it
falls for old firms (see Proposition 2).
II The life cycle pattern described in I is more pronounced for more opaque firms,
i.e., firms with more severe asymmetric information problems (see Proposition
3 ii).
III Banks will on average lend to firms with higher bankruptcy probability if the
lock-in eﬀect is stronger (see Proposition 4).
IV More opaque firms have a longer lock-in period (see Proposition 3 i).
Unlike the existing literature, our empirical model allows us to distinguish eﬀects
originating from asymmetric information from those originating from market con-
centration. In their much cited paper, Petersen and Rajan (1995) examine pricing
and credit availability associated with the degree of competition in credit markets,
measured as market concentration. They introduce a theoretical model which they
use to show how credit availability and intertemporal pricing of loans may depend
on market concentration. Consistent with their theoretical model they find that
concentrated credit markets allow banks to take a loss initially in order to bene-
fit from a long-term relationship with a borrower. In Petersen and Rajan (1995)
market concentration determines to what extent firms can establish long-term re-
lationships. In contrast, we examine directly whether asymmetrically dispersed
information between inside and outside banks is crucial for establishing long-term
bank relationships. It is the informational advantage of the inside bank that reduces
competition and allows the bank to intertemporally share its surplus in a long-term
bank relationship. In order to make our study comparable with Petersen and Rajan
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(1995) we introduce market concentration variables in addition to asymmetric in-
formation variables. In this way we can examine whether market concentration has
a separate eﬀect on the intertemporal pricing of loans (see Hypothesis V below).
Petersen and Rajan (1995) assume that bank loans are homogenous. In con-
trast, Boot and Thakor (2000) suggest that banks may change their type of lending
when the competitive environment changes. They present a theoretical model where
banks strategically choose how much of their lending they want to do as transaction
based lending compared with relationship lending. Relationship lending increases
the success probability of borrowers projects and therefore makes borrowers will-
ing to pay higher interest rates. If reduced market concentration induces banks
to provide more valuable relationship loans, interest rate markups may increase as
markets get less concentrated8. This suggests Hypothesis VI below. To summarize,
by including a market concentration measure in our empirical model we are able to
also test the following two opposing hypotheses:
V Reduced market concentration leads to lower interest rate markups for mature
firms and higher markups for de novo firms. This eﬀect of market concentra-
tion on interest rate markup will lend support to the findings by Petersen and
Rajan (1995).
VI Reduced market concentration leads to higher interest rate markup for an aver-
age borrower. Assuming higher interest rate markups in relationship banking
compared with transaction based banking, this finding may lend support to
Boot and Thakor (2000).
To test the above hypotheses I to VI, we present an econometric model with the
actual interest rate markup (i.e., the actual interest rate minus the risk adjusted
zero expected profits interest rate) paid by firms as the LHS variable. For RHS
variables we use the age of the firm (represented by two dummies for three diﬀerent
age groups: young, middle aged, and mature firms), a variable representing the
degree of asymmetric information, and a variable measuring market concentration
in the diﬀerent credit markets covered by the data.
8We are not able to ex ante separate transaction based borrowers from relationship borrowers
in our sample. However, such a separation is not necessary when one can assume that there are
higher interest rate markups in relationship banking compared with transaction based lending.
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We specify the risk-adjusted zero-expected profits interest rate as the interest
rate a borrowing firm would pay in a world with a risk neutral competitive banking
industry in the following way:
1 + rf,t = pi,t(1− LGB) + (1− pi,t) · (1 + r∗i,t)
r∗i,t =
rf,t + pi,tLGB
1− pi,t
where rf,t is the risk-free money market interest rate, pi,t is the probability at time t
that firm i will go bankrupt, LGB is the loss given bankruptcy, i.e., the fraction of
the principal of the loan that the bank will have to write oﬀ in case of bankruptcy.9
r∗i,t is then defined as the risk-adjusted interest rate.
Our LHS variable, the interest rate markup is thus
mi,t = ri,t − r∗i,t , (3.1)
where ri,t is the actual interest rate firm i pays in year t. r∗i,t is the average of the
risk-adjusted interest rate for year t based on the bankruptcy probability pi,t−1 and
the risk-adjusted interest rate for year t based on the bankruptcy probability pi,t.
In both cases the risk-free interest rate for year t, rf,t is used. Our motivation for
using this average is the fact that during year t only the information from balance
sheet and income statements for year t− 1 are publicly available. However, a bank
lending to a firm in year t will also seek current information from the firm’s books
to further help assessing the bankruptcy probability of the firm.
The general form of our empirical model is
mi,t = (AINFO,dAGE;i,t, concentration, i,t) , (3.2)
AINFO is a variable representing the severity of asymmetric information. dAGE;i,t
is a vector of the dummies representing the age group for firm i in year t. It will
9In the actual empirical model LGB is set at 0.6. The Basel Committee suggests in its Third
Consultative Paper, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2003), that loss given default (LGD)
is set to 45% for senior unsecured debt and 75 % for subordinated claims without specific collateral
(the IRB Foundation approach). Note however that we look at bankruptcy which is more ‘severe’
than default.
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enable us to test how the interest rate markup diﬀers between firms of various ages.
concentration captures the degree of concentration in the credit market from which
the firm demands credit. i,t is the stochastic residual.
3.2. Data
Our data are collected from the SEBRA-database covering all limited liability firms
in Norway.10 This database contains annual financial statements (balance sheets
and income statements) from 1988 to 2001. It also contains information about
firms’ characteristics such as the industrial sector code, the geographical location of
the firms’ head oﬃces, and firms’ age. In addition, we apply results from a model
predicting bankruptcy probability for each firm and each year (see Appendix B).
In this model, bankruptcy is defined as the event in which a firm declares itself
bankrupt within the next three years. The predicted bankruptcy probabilities from
the model are added to the database.11 In our empirical model we use these predicted
bankruptcy probabilities.
From year 2000 the SEBRA-database allows us to separate bank loans from
other debt. Hence, we use data from year 2000 and 2001. The database contains
information for approximately 130,000 firms each year, and initially we are left with
a quarter of a million observations. Of those, however, we only consider non-financial
firms. Since we are particularly interested in the asymmetric information aspect in
relationship lending we have removed firms that have issued bonds and thus often
have a bond rating. Furthermore we drop firms that either lend to or borrow from
other companies in a conglomerate. Lending inside a conglomerate is not associated
with significant asymmetric information problems. We also exclude large firms,
those with an annual operating income above 100 NOK million, leaving us with a
sample of rather small firms, firms about which there is little public information.
Actual paid interest rates are calculated from firms’ income statements and bal-
ance sheets by dividing each firm’s interest cost by the unweighted average of bank
loans outstanding at the end of year t − 1 and t.12 Since most loans extended by
10The SEBRA-database is owned by Norges Bank (The central bank of Norway), and is based
on data supplied and quality tested by Dun and Bradstreet.
11This model is described in Eklund, Larsen, and Bernhardsen (2001), and a more comprehensive
description is given in Bernhardsen (2001).
12Some firms have large changes in their lending during the beginning or the end of the year. This
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max
Operating income 5921 10409.4 -4607 99661
Total assets 5529 14992.23 0 665162
Bank debt to total assets .75 11.56 0 1771
Interest rate 0.117 0.0426 0.06 0.2499
Interest rate markup 0.0265 0.0563 −1.242 0.1795
Probability of bankruptcy .02431 .05143 .00006 .68401
Firm age 11.2 13.1 0 149
Number of observations is 60,362. Operating income and total assets are mea-
sured in NOK thousands. Bank debt to total assets is measured as a ratio.
Interest rate and interest rate markup are also measured as ratios. Probability
of bankruptcy, measured as a ratio, is predicted from the SEBRA model. Firm
age is measured in years.
Norwegian banks have a floating interest rate, we believe our approach of calcu-
lating interest rate is more accurate than interest rates that can be collected from
loan contracts annually. In 2000 and 2001 the central bank changed its deposit rate
five times and one time, respectively. Contractual interest rates observed once a
year would not capture these changes in interest rates. By calculating the interest
rates using the interest cost for the whole year, we implicitly include the intra-year
changes of interest rates.
Our panel then consists of 35,423 firms in 2000 and 24,939 firms in 2001. Of
these 24,939 firms 24,520 are observed in both years. Table 3.1 gives a summary of
some of the interesting characteristics of the firms in the sample.
Table 3.1 illustrates that there is a considerable firm heterogeneity in the sample.
3,094 of the firms have zero bank debt by the end of one of the years. Of the 60,362
observations 6.4 pct. of the firms have bank debt to total assets larger than unity.
i.e., they are technically, but not necessarily legally bankrupt. This variation in
leads to unrealistically low or high calculated interest rates for those firms. Such phenomena occur
more frequently for larger firms. That is one further motive for excluding from the sample large
firms, defined as firms with annual sales in excess of NOK 100 million corresponding to appr. EUR
12.5 million. This leaves out 5203 observations or 8.6 pct. of the final number of observations.
We also exclude remaining observations with pathological interest rates. In an empirical work
also based on the SEBRA-database Bernhardsen and Larsen (2003) use the same procedure for
calculating firm borrowing interest rate. In their paper they find strong evidence that this a
reasonably accurate measure of the interest rate borrowing firms face.
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the probability of bankruptcy to some extent also spills over to the interest rate
markup. There are a few firms in the sample with large negative markups. These
are firms with high bankruptcy probabilities for which the risk-adjusted interest rates
are correspondingly high. Large negative markups can be due to banks aggressive
pricing of loans to new borrowers as suggested by our theory model.13
There is also considerable variation in the age of firms. The average firm in the
sample is just below 12 years, and the oldest firm is 149 years. The age distribution
in the sample is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1 shows that the peak age of firms in our sample is 3 years. The
median age is 7 years and the mean just above 11 years. This skewed distribution
is typical for the age of firms in large samples. Many of the relatively young firms
will not survive as independent entities because they go bankrupt, are closed before
bankruptcy, or are acquired by other firms. Nevertheless 7,646 or 12.7 pct. of the
observations in the sample relate to firms 20 years or older.
We suggest a novel measure of the severity of asymmetric information problems
between inside and outside banks. In line with our theoretical model, we assume
that an inside bank obtains information about firms credit worthiness before outside
banks. This information advantage of inside banks is particularly valuable in indus-
tries where firms’ credit worthiness change quickly. Hence we propose the volatility
of bankruptcy probability in the industry to which the firm belongs, as a measure of
the inside banks’ information advantage over outside banks. Figure 3.2 illustrates
the change in bankruptcy probability for three diﬀerent firms in our sample.14 Con-
sider a firm belonging to an industry where firms’ bankruptcy probabilities and
credit ratings vary considerably over time. Soft information about firms’ prospects
acquired through a bank relationship is particularly valuable in such industries. This
13Alternatively, a large negative markup can be due to firms’ moral hazard problems which
prevent banks from increasing the interest rate (see Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Williamson
(1987)).
14For the high volatility firm in Figure 3.2 the volatility of bankruptcy probability is just below
the 95 pct. fractile. For the low volatility low bankruptcy probability firm both the bankruptcy
probability and its volatility are below the 5 pct. fractile. The low volatility high bankruptcy
probability firm has for three consecutive years a bankruptcy probability around the 85 pct. fractile,
its bankruptcy probability falls and after a few years remains below the lower quartile. Its volatility,
however is around the 15 pct. fractile.
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of firm age. Number of observations 60,362.
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Figure 3.2: Volatility of bankruptcy probabilities.
informational advantage of the inside bank may expose the firms in this industry to
considerable informational lock-in eﬀects.15
3.3. The empirical model
Our theoretical model predicts that the interest rate markup is lower for younger
firms, than for middle aged firms. For older, or more mature firms, it will again be
lower. Furthermore, the model predicts that firms facing severe asymmetric infor-
mation problems (more costly monitoring) experience a more pronounced markup
cycle. In order to test these hypotheses we assign firms into three diﬀerent age
groups; young firms, middle aged firms, and old firms. Age groups are represented
by dummies. Furthermore we allow the age dummies to interact with our measure-
ment of the severity of asymmetric information.
15An alternative measure of the inside bank’s information advantage, could be the errors in
the predictions of the bankruptcy probability model SEBRA. However, use of such a measure
would implicitly assume that the inside bank has perfect information about the true bankruptcy
probability of a borrower from the start of the lending relationship. We believe this is a too strong
assumption, therefore we choose not to use this measure
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As alluded to earlier, we want our empirical model to also enable a test of the two
alternative predictions set out by Petersen and Rajan (1995) and Boot and Thakor
(2000). In the paper by Petersen and Rajan the potential lock-in phenomenon of
borrowers in relationship banking may stem from the exogenous competitiveness of
the credit market, represented by a market concentration variable. In Boot and
Thakor market concentration leads to more transactional lending and lower average
interest rates.16 Therefore we include a measure of credit market concentration
and allow it to interact with firm age dummies in the same way as our measure
of asymmetric information. Consequently, our empirical model can be used to test
whether asymmetric information, credit market concentration, or both determine
how the interest rate markup evolves over a firm’s age.
We apply the following empirical model:
mi,t = β0 + β1dY OUNG;i,t + β2dOLD;i,t + β3VLc,k + β4VLc,k · dY OUNG;i,t (3.3)
+β5VLc,k · dOLD;i,t + β6HIc,t + β7HIc,t · dY OUNG;i,t + β8HIc,t · dOLD;i,t + i,t ,
where:
dY OUNG;i,t is a dummy taking value 1 if the firm is 10 years old or younger, 0
otherwise.17
dOLD;i,t is a dummy taking value 1 if the firm is older than 20 years, 0 otherwise.
∆pi,t is the change in bankruptcy probability of firm i from year t− 1 to year t.
σ(∆pi) is the standard deviation over time of∆pi,t, i.e., a measure of the volatility in
the bankruptcy probability of firm i. As discussed above, we use this volatility
measure as a proxy for the asymmetric information problems related to lend-
ing to firm i. Higher volatility implies more severe asymmetric information
problems.
VLc,k is the mean of σ(∆pi) for all firms in industry sector k in county c. Essentially
it captures the volatility of the bankruptcy probability of firms in the specific
16Note that Boot and Thakor (2000) introduce a static model which does not have implication
for the dynamic structure of interest rate markups.
17Cf. (Petersen and Rajan, 1995, p. 420) who also classify firms 10 years and younger as young
firms.
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industry and county. We regard it as a proxy for the severity of the ex ante
asymmetric information problem in lending to a firm within this particular
group of firms.18
HIc,t is the Herfindahl index for county c in year t, measuring the market concen-
tration of bank loans to all domestic non-financial business borrowers. Data
for this variable is collected from the Norwegian banks statistics produced by
Norges Bank (ORBOF).19
4. Results and discussion
The model (3.3) is estimated using OLS andWhite robust standard errors.20 Results
are presented in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1 shows that, ceteris paribus, young firms are charged a significantly lower
interest rate markup than the group of middle aged firms (our reference group)21.
So is also the case with the older firms, i.e., those older than 20 years of age. Thus,
we find support for the life cycle pattern of interest rate markups over firms’ age,
as predicted by our theoretical model (Hypothesis I): All else equals, young firms
are charged a lower interest rate markup compared to middle aged firms. As firms
mature and get old (older than 20 years) they are again charged a lower interest
18To calculate V Lc,k we use observations spanning the whole period of the SEBRA-database,
1988 to 2001.
19In calculating the Herfindahl index we also include lending from mortgage companies to non-
financial business borrowers. If a mortgage company is owned by a bank its loans are considered
as part of the banks’ loans. However, we do not include lending from finance companies, that
mainly do factoring and leasing. Debts to these companies normally will not be included in the
debt numbers we use to calculate the interest rates paid by borrowing firms.
20We note that the Herfindahl index HIc,t has constant values over all observations pertaining
to one particular county in one particular year, that is, it is clustered. Clustering of RHS-variables
tend to bias the estimated parameter standard errors downwards, (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mul-
lainathan (2004)). To alleviate this potential problem we estimate the model using White robust
standard errors also robust to clustering, by adjusting the variance-covariance matrix for those
clusters using the cluster command in STATA.
21We define young firms as those 10 years old or younger. We also run the model with young
firms being 5 years old or younger. However, the results obtained with that definition indicate that
firms in the age group 5 to 10 years old still are subsidized by their bank.
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Table 4.1: Results, dependent variable mi,t
Independent variable Coeﬃcient Robust t-values
β0 0.04163 9.88∗∗
dY OUNG;i,t −0.00708 −2.38∗∗
dOLD;i,t −0.01425 −3.62∗∗
VLc,k 0.06322 2.83∗∗
VLc,k · dY OUNG;i,t −0.5314 −15.65∗∗
VLc,k · dOLD;i,t 0.2253 5.34∗∗
HIc,t −3.27 · 10−6 −1.57
HIc,t · dY OUNG;i,t 2.98 · 10−6 1.81∗
HIc,t · dOLD;i,t 3.26 · 10−6 1.51
F -test for HIc,t terms 1.24
# clusters 36
# observations 60362
R2adj. 0.0422
The t-values reported are White-robust and adjusted for cluster-
ing of HIc,t. ∗ represents a 10 pct. statistical significance and ∗∗
5 pct. significance
rate markup.22
The negative and significant value of the coeﬃcient for VLc,k ·dY OUNG;i,t indicates
that for young firms the interest rate markup is decreasing in the informational
advantage of the inside bank. The positive and significant values of the coeﬃcients
for VLc,k and for VLc,k · dOLD;i,t show that middle aged and old firms, respectively,
both face higher interest rate markups the more severe the problems of asymmetric
information for those firms are. These results support the hypothesis that the life
cycle pattern of the interest rate markup is more pronounced for more opaque firms,
i.e., firms which face stronger informational lock-in eﬀects (Hypothesis II). Figure
4.1 illustrates how the markup for a typical firm changes as it moves through the
three diﬀerent age classes, young, middle aged, and old, keeping V Lc,k and HIc,t
constant. The vertical arrows indicate how the respective interest rate markups
would shift as the opaqueness of the firm, V Lc,k, increases.
22The way we have defined markup in this model it is not pure rent. It will also cover banks’
operating costs. In addition there may be rent stemming from other deviations from perfect
competition than those studied in this model. See for instance Kim, Kristiansen, and Vale (2005).
These elements have been left out of our theoretical model. Hence the fact that our empirical
model in (3.3) will yield positive interest rate markup even for young firms with very high severity
of asymmetric information problem, can be consistent with the prediction of our theory model.
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Figure 4.1: Interest rate markup for the three diﬀerent age groups. The qualitative
eﬀects from increased volatility (V Lc,k) is illustrated by the vertical arrows.
The coeﬃcient for HIc,t is negative but not statistically significant. Neither is
the coeﬃcient of HIc,t · dOLD;i,t. The coeﬃcient of HIc,t · dY OUNG;i,t is positive and
significant at the 10 pct. level. Jointly the terms containing HIc,t are not significant,
as demonstrated by the F -test. These results lead to a rejection of Hypothesis V
that lower market concentration should lead to lower interest rate markup for old
firms and higher markups for younger firms. I.e., we do not find support for the
link between market concentration and interest rate markup charged to young firms
as found in Petersen and Rajan (1995). Neither do the results give support to the
competing Hypothesis VI: lower market concentration leads to higher interest rate
markup.
Our results demonstrate that the informational advantage of the inside bank
(measured as the volatility of firms’ bankruptcy probability), and not market con-
centration, creates lock-in eﬀects. Thus, to what extent banks subsidize very young
firms in order to capture lock-in rents when firms are older, is determined by the
informational advantage of the inside bank. A traditional measure of market com-
petition, like the Herfindahl index, cannot explain the life-cycle of the interest rate
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markup. We also run the model (3.3) replacing the Herfindahl index with the com-
bined market share of the three largest banks in each market. The results were
qualitatively the same as those reported in table 4.1.
The above empirical model (3.3) can not be used to test hypothesis III: banks
will on average lend to riskier young firms if informational lock-in eﬀects become
stronger. To test this hypothesis we suggest the following procedure: First, we
calculate the average bankruptcy probability for all observations of firms 10 years
and younger within each industry sector k in each county c, pY OUNG;c,k. For the same
groups of observations we calculate the average interest rate markup, mY OUNG;c,k.
We use these data to run the following simple regression
pY OUNG;c,k = α0 + α1mY OUNG;c,k + c,k (4.1)
Hypothesis III suggests a negative sign of α1, i.e., a more pronounced lock-in eﬀect,
measured as lower markup for young firms, implies that the average credit worthi-
ness for young firms decreases. The estimated α1 coeﬃcient is −0.6856, and the
White robust t-value is −34.70.23 This result indicates that increased lock-in due to
asymmetric information improves the credit availability for young high-risk firms.
Thus, hypothesis III is confirmed.
Our next step is to test Hypothesis IV: more opaque firms face longer lock-in
periods. First, we calculate the predicted markup, bm, for the three diﬀerent age
groups (cf. Figure 4.1), keeping HIc,t at its median value, and varying V Lc,k. If
firms with high V Lc,k face an interest rate markup that is increasing over firm age,
while firms with a median or low V Lc,k face a significant drop in their interest rate
markup as they become old, we consider this as supporting Hypothesis IV: firms
with severe asymmetric information problems face longer lock-in periods. In Table
4.2 we report the predicted markup, bm, and its standard errors for the three diﬀerent
age groups for V Lc,k at its median value and at its 95 pct. fractile value.
23The number of observations is 4950 and the R-squared is 0.488.
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Table 4.2: Predicted markups
Median value of V Lc,k
Age group Predicted markup Std. error
Young firms 0.0227 0.0008
Middle aged firms 0.0386 0.0015
Old firms 0.0344 0.0011
95 pct. fractile of V Lc,k
Age group Predicted markup Std. error
Young firms 0.0040 0.0017
Middle aged firms 0.0411 0.0019
Old firms 0.0459 0.0026
The predicted markups and their standard errors are reported
as ratios. Young firms are firms 10 years or younger. Old firms
are firms older than 20 years.
0.0386 
0.0344 
20 years 1 year 
0.0227 
Interest rate 
markup 
10 years Firm age 
Median value of VOLc,k  
Figure 4.2:
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Figure 4.3:
As shown in Table 4.2, for a firm with a median value of our opaqueness measure
V Lc,k, the predicted markup is more than two standard errors lower for an old firm
than for a middle aged firm. However, for a firm with a value of V Lc,k corresponding
to the 95 pct. fractile, the markup for an old firm is a little less than two standard
errors higher than the markup for the middle aged firm. Hence, we have a 5 pct.
significant fall in the markup for firms with median opaqueness going from middle
to old age, and a 10 pct. significant increase in the markup for the firms with an
opaqueness at the 95 pct. fractile going from middle to old age. See the illustrations
in Figures 4.2 and 4.3. Thus, the lock-in period for very opaque firm lasts on, as
opposed to less opaque firms where the markup reaches a maximum when firms are
in the middle age. These results support our Hypothesis IV; more opaque firms
have a longer lock-in period. However, with the setup of our model we are only
able to detect empirically a longer lock-in period for firms with severe asymmetric
information problems.
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Since 63 per cent of our observations relate to young firms (firms 10 years old
and younger), it could be argued that the volatility measure that proxies for the
importance of soft information and potential for lock-in, may be dominated by higher
bankruptcy volatility among the young firms. In order to check the robustness of
our results with respect to this, we replaced V Lc,k with a similar measure but now
calculated only from firms older than 10 years, i.e., middle-aged and old firms. We
rerun the model (3.3). The qualitative results remained the same as shown in this
section, with just one exception.24 See Appendix B.
5. Concluding remarks
We develop a theoretical model explaining the life cycle pattern of bank-borrower
relationships. Our model predicts that, in order to attract new borrowers, banks
oﬀer loans with low or even negative interest rate markups to young firms. The
inside bank — the bank at which a borrower initially has borrowed — obtains an
information advantage which later on leads to lock-in eﬀects and positive interest
markups. As firms mature further they become more attractive borrowers for outside
banks. That induces outside banks to make their own credit assessments in order to
make competing loan oﬀers. This additional monitoring results in a more dispersed
firm-specific information and lower lock-in eﬀects and, consequently, lower interest
rate markups. Our theoretical model predicts that a stronger information advantage
of the inside bank leads to a more pronounced life-cycle of interest rate markups
and longer lock-in period. Using a large sample of Norwegian small firms and a
novel measure of asymmetric information related to lending to each firm, we find
empirical support for these hypotheses.
A large share of the existing literature has used market concentration in the
loan market to explain interest rate markups. Our approach allows us to distin-
guish market-concentration eﬀects from informational lock-in eﬀects. In contrast to
Petersen and Rajan (1995) which focus on market concentration variables, we find
that our asymmetric information variables better explain the interest rate markup
24The exception is V Lc,k which is no longer statistically significant, although it is still positive.
As alluded to in Appendix B, this may reflect the fact that the age at which firms become locked-
in will vary between industries or even between firms, and thus will be diﬃcult to determine
accurately.
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charged to young firms. We do not find any significant eﬀect of market concentration
on interest rate markups as predicted by Petersen and Rajan. Our study illustrates
that banks market power is more closely related to the banks’ information advantage
— an Akerlof eﬀect, than to its market share — a Herfindahl eﬀect.
Furthermore, we find that stronger lock-in eﬀects make banks more willing to lend
to young high-risk firms. Thus, lock-in may contribute to the availability of bank
credit to such firms.25 This may have implications concerning financial stability. In
a recession we would expect to see that banks experience more loan losses in market
segments with significant lock-in eﬀects than in other market segments.
The model we introduced contributes to the further understanding of the in-
teraction and relationships established between banks and their borrowers. The
specific methods by which a bank obtains soft information about a borrower during
a relationship remains, however, to be further explored.
25See Petersen and Rajan (1995) which in their empirical analysis examine how credit availability
is associated with market concentration in the credit market.
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Appendix
A. The bankruptcy probability model SEBRA
This appendix contains a brief description of the bankruptcy prediction model
SEBRA. More detailed presentations are given in Eklund, Larsen, and Bernhardsen
(2001) and in Bernhardsen (2001).
The SEBRA model is estimated based on individual limited liability firm ac-
counting data. The model predicts the probability that a firm has its last year with
a submitted account and within the next three years the firm is registered as bank-
rupt. All RHS variables, which are either firm or industry specific, are collected from
the Register for Business Enterprises26 where all Norwegian limited liability firms
have to file their annual income and balance statements.27 The data used to esti-
mate SEBRA covers the years 1990 — 1996. Firms with total assets less than NOK
200,000 (≈ 25,000 euros) are excluded. The total data set used consists of about
400,000 firm observations. The estimated model is a logit model in the predicted
bankruptcy probability bp with the following RHS variables xi:
• Earnings
— earnings in per cent of total assets (tkr)
• Liquidity
— liquid assets less short-term debt in per cent of operating revenues (lik)
— unpaid indirect taxes in per cent of total assets (ube)
— trade accounts payable in per cent of total assets (lev)
• Financial strength
— equity in per cent of total assets (eka)
— dummy for the event of book equity less than paid-in capital (taptek)
26Foretaksregisteret i Brønnøysund
27Electronic versions of these acoounts have been supplied by Dun & Bradstreet.
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— dummy for dividend payments the last accounting year (div)
• Industry variables
— industry average for eka (meaneka)
— industry average for lev (meanlev)
— industry standard deviation for tkr (stdtkr)
• Age
— dummy variable for each of the first 8 years of the firm’s age
• Size
— total assets (size)
The structure of the model is as follow:
bp = 1
1 + e−ey
where
by = bβ0 + bβ1T1(x1) + bβ2T2(x2) + . . .+ bβkTk(xk) and
Ti(xi) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
1
1 + e
−

xi−eαi
eδi
 if xi ∈ {eka, tkr, lik, lev, ube}
xi if xi /∈ {eka, tkr, lik, lev, ube}
The values of the estimated coeﬃcients are reported in Eklund, Larsen, and
Bernhardsen (2001). As expected bp is decreasing in tkr, eka, and lik, and it is
increasing in lev and ube. For the first 8 years of a firm’s life the model predicts
lower bankruptcy probability by each year, except going from the first to the second
year. After 8 years age has by construction no eﬀect on the bankruptcy probability.
For the 5 non-linearly transformed variables the marginal eﬀect on bp is non-linear in
the sense that the absolute value of the marginal eﬀect has a peak around a certain
value of xi.
30
Syversten (2004) compares the predictive power of the SEBRA model with that
of Moody’s KMV Private Firm model for Norway — hereafter referred to as KMV.28
He uses "power curves" and their corresponding "accuracy ratios" to compare the
bankruptcy predictions of SEBRA and the default probability predictions of KMV
to actual bankruptcies for the four years 1998 — 2001. Syversten concludes that
SEBRA’s accuracy is as good as or somewhat better than the accuracy of KMV.
28As KMV for Norway only covers about 3,500 firms and the SEBRA model covers more than
100,000 firms the comparison is based on a relatively small sample of the firms in the SEBRA
model.
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Table B.1: Results, dependent variable mi,t, alterantive measure of V Lc,k
Independent variable Coeﬃcient Robust t-values
β0 0.04319 10.45∗∗
dY OUNG;i,t −0.01611 −5.73∗∗
dOLD;i,t −0.01282 −3.13∗∗
VLc,k 0.01591 0.62
VLc,k · dY OUNG;i,t −0.2543 −6.18∗∗
VLc,k · dOLD;i,t 0.1817 2.61∗∗
HIc,t −3.39 · 10−6 −1.62
HIc,t · dY OUNG;i,t 2.67 · 10−6 1.60
HIc,t · dOLD;i,t 3.60 · 10−6 1.66
F -test for HIc,t terms 1.12
# clusters 36
# observations 54886
R2adj. 0.0246
The t-values reported are White-robust and adjusted for cluster-
ing of HIc,t. ∗ represents a 10 pct. statistical significance and ∗∗
5 pct. significance
B. Applying a diﬀerent volatility measure
To check whether our results related to the estimation of (3.3) are driven by poten-
tially higher volatility of the bankruptcy probability among young firms, we rerun
(3.3) using a volatility measure excluding young firms. I.e., when calculating V Lc,k
we now only include firms 11 years old or older. Estimation results using this alter-
native volatility measure are shown in Table B.1.
As can be seen these results are qualitatively the same as those reported in Table
4.1, except that the coeﬃcient of V Lc,k, although positive, is no longer statistically
significant. The economic interpretation of this latter result is that increased volatil-
ity does no longer increase the lock-in eﬀect of the middle-aged firms. However, this
may simply reflect the fact that the age at which firms no longer are young, in
the sense of becoming locked-in by their lenders will vary between industries or
even between firms. Thus this age may be diﬃcult to determine accurately from a
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heterogeneous sample.29
The tests carried out for Hypothesis IV give the same qualitative results when
using the alternative volatility measure as those reported in Table 4.2.
29The robustness check performed in this appendix was also conducted defining young firms as
those 12 years and younger. In that case the qualitative results were the same, but this time both
the coeﬃcient for V Lc,k and the coeﬃcient for V Lc,k · dOLD;i,t were statistically significant at the
10 per cent level.
33
References
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2003): “Consultative Document: The
New Basel Capital Accord,” http://www.bis.org/bcbs/bcbscp3.htm.
Berger, A. N., I. Hasan, and L. F. Klapper (2003): “Further Evidence on the Link
between Finance and Growth: An International Analysis of Community Banking
and Economic Performance,” Policy Working Paper 3105, World Bank.
Bernhardsen, E. (2001): “A model of bankruptcy prediction,” Working Paper
2001/10, Norges Bank, Oslo.
Bernhardsen, E., and K. Larsen (2003): “Banks’ pricing of risk associated with
corporate lending,” Norges Bank, Economic Bulletin, 54, 24—34.
Bertrand, M., E. Duflo, and S. Mullainathan (2004): “How much should we trust
the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimates?,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119,
249—275.
Black, S. E., and P. E. Strahan (2002): “Entrepreneurship and Bank Credit Avail-
ability,” Journal of Finance, 57, 2807—2833.
Boot, A. W., and A. V. Thakor (2000): “Can Relationship banking Survive Com-
petition?,” Journal of Finance, 55, 679—713.
Carletti, E. (2004): “The structure of bank relationships, endogenous monitoring,
and loan rates,” Journal of Financial Intermediation, 13, 58—86.
Cetorelli, N. (2004): “Real Eﬀects of Bank Competition,” Journal of Money, Credit,
and Banking, 63, 543—558.
Cetorelli, N., and M. Gambera (2001): “Banking Market Structure, Financial De-
pendence and Growth: International Evidence from Industry Data,” Journal of
Finance, 56, 617—648.
Degryse, H., and S. Ongena (2004): “The Impact of Competition on Bank Orienta-
tion and Specialization,” Discussion paper, Tilburg University.
Dell’Ariccia, G., and R. Marquez (2004): “Information and Bank Credit Allocation,”
Journal of Financial Economics, 72, 185—214.
Detragiache, E., P. Garella, and L. Guiso (2000): “Multiple versus Single Banking
Relationships: Theory and Evidence,” Journal of Finance, 55, 1133—1161.
34
Eklund, T., K. Larsen, and E. Bernhardsen (2001): “Model for analysing credit risk
in the enterprise sector,” Norges Bank, Economic Bulletin, 72(3), 99—106.
Elsas, R. (2005): “Emprical Determinants of Relationship Lending,” Journal of
Financial Intermediation, 14, 32—57.
Kim, M., E. G. Kristiansen, and B. Vale (2005): “Endogenous product diﬀerentiation
in credit markets: What do borrowers pay for?,” Journal of Banking and Finance,
29, 681—699.
Krishna, V. (2002): Auction Theory. Academic Press.
Ongena, S., and D. C. Smith (2000): “What determines the number of bank re-
lationships? Cross-country evidence,” Journal of Financial Intermediation, 9,
26—56.
Petersen, M., and R. Rajan (1995): “The eﬀect of credit market competition on
lending relationships,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 406—443.
Rajan, R. G. (1992): “Insiders and Outsiders, the Choice Between Informed and
Arm’s-length Debt,” Journal of Finance, 47, 1367—1400.
Sharpe, S. A. (1990): “Asymmetric information, bank lending, and implicit con-
tracts: A stylized model of customer relationships,” Journal of Finance, 45, 1069—
1087.
Stiglitz, J. E., and A. Weiss (1981): “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect
Information,” American Economic Review, 71, 393—410.
Syversten, B.-D. (2004): “How accurate are credit risk models for Norwegian firms?,”
Norges Bank, Economic Bulletin, LXXV, Forthcoming.
Thakor, A. (1996): “Capital requirements, monetary policy and aggregate bank
lending: Theory and empirical evidence,” Journal of Finance, 51, 279—324.
von Thadden, E.-L. (2004): “Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending, and Implicit
Contracts: The Winner’s Curse,” Finance Research Letters, 1, 11—23.
Williamson, S. D. (1987): “Costly monitoring, loan contracts, and equilibrium credit
rationing,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102, 135—145.
35
